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tax deductible.1 Traditionally, most advertising costs
are specifically included within these tax deductions.2 While
advertising generally serves as a useful channel to inform
consumers, the direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs should not, and need not constitutionally, be
treated the same as other advertising. As the Magazine Publishers’ Association put it, “You can learn all you need to
know about beer in 30 seconds. But, a prescription drug?”3
Prescription drugs have the ability to improve people’s health
when appropriately prescribed, but can have a range of negative short- and long-term consequences when inappropriately
used. Prescribing decisions should therefore be based on scientific evidence with the goal of obtaining the best possible
treatment, instead of making additional profits for the drug
companies.4 Thus, Congress could consider revoking the tax
deductions for DTCA as a means of imposing a “sin tax”5 to
disincentivize spending on DTCA without running afoul of
regulating speech.6
Proponents of DTCA argue that it provides important
benefits, such as improving public health by encouraging
viewers to speak with their doctors about health problems
that might otherwise go untreated.7 Opponents, however, ar1. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2006).
2. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(j) (saying that “certain foreign advertising expenses”
are explicitly excluded); see also, e.g., Poletti v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818, 822
(8th Cir. 1964).
3. Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-To-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising,
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 164 (1999) (citing an advertisement which appeared in
the Wall Street Journal).
4. See Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry
and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886, 886 (2002) [hereinafter Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness] (stating that “[i]nappropriate medicalization carries
the dangers of unnecessary labelling, [sic] poor treatment decisions, iatrogenic
illness, and economic waste, as well as the opportunity costs that result when
resources are diverted away from treating or preventing more serious disease”).
5. See Rachel E. Morse, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the
Texas “Pole Tax” and the New Class of Modern Sin Taxes Are Bad Policy, 29
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189, 191 (2009) (explaining sin taxes as “targeted excise
taxes imposed on the sale of disfavored goods or services” which are commonly
used in connection with alcohol and tobacco).
6. See generally David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2011)
(discussing sin taxes and the common use thereof to encourage or discourage
non-tax behavior).
7. This point, however, is undisputed. Indeed, some believe that DTCA
has a positive impact. See, e.g., Mark B. McClellan, MD, Ph.D., FDA Commissioner, Speech before First International Colloquium on Generic Medicine (Sept.
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gue that DTCA disperses deceptive information, hinders the
patient-doctor relationship, encourages patients to choose
drug-based solutions over lifestyle-based ones, reduces the
amount spent on research and development, and increases
spending on drugs without a corresponding health benefit.8
Indeed, DTCA spending has out-paced spending on research
and development 9 and the prevalence of Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) warning letters demonstrates pharmaceutical companies’ frequent failures to comply with
advertising regulations that the FDA is under-resourced to
police. 10 During September 2010 alone, the FDA issued
eleven warning letters to pharmaceutical companies primarily regarding “ internet marketing of unapproved and
misbranded drugs.”11 The problem with DTCA has “attracted
enough congressional attention to warrant at least six bills in
25,
2003),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm
053614.htm (stating that “on net [DTC] advertising benefits the public health”
and also arguing that “although the ads are highly visible, they account for less
than 2 percent of U.S. pharmaceutical spending, and so they can’t be a key
driver of drug costs”); see also Frank Lichtenberg & Gautier Duflos, Time Release: The Effect of Patent Expiration on U.S. Drug Prices, Marketing and
Utilization by the Public, 11 MED. PROGRESS REP. 1, 12 (2009) (explaining that “
marketing has a significant impact on utilization” which in turn improves public
health and therefore restrictions on advertising should be carefully considered).
8. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Relationships with the Drug Industry: Keep at
Arm’s Length, 338 BRIT. MED. J. b222 (2009) [hereinafter Angell, Relationships]
(explaining that DTCA is often aimed at “me-too drugs and are designed to convince viewers that one is better than another, despite the fact that these drugs
are seldom compared in clinical trials at equivalent doses. Many seek to convince people that they have chronic disorders that require lifelong drug
treatment . . . . with the implication that it needs to be treated to prevent serious complications . . . . We need to stop accepting the fiction that marketing,
whether to prescribers or patients, is good education.”).
9. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 132–33 (2004) [hereinafter
ANGELL, THE TRUTH]. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-07-54, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S
OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 5, 12 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter GAO-07-54], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Bad Ad Program: FDA Aims to Keep Drug Promotion Truthful,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/ucm211791.htm; Susan Heavey & Lisa Richwine, Special
Report: Outgunned FDA Tries to Get Tough with Drug Ads, REUTERS (Sept. 3,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/us-drugs-advertising-idUSTRE
6821PN20100903.
11. Warning Letters 2009, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFD
A/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm
055773.htm (last updated June 27, 2011).
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the 110th Congress as well as concerns from members in the
111th.”12 For instance, the Say No to Drug Ads Act of 2009
proposed the removal of tax deductions specifically for
DTCA.13 Yet, to the relief of the drug companies and the
marketing industry, multiple bills introduced to Congress
proposing to remove the tax deductions have not been
passed.14 Neither this Article nor the proposed legislation
discussed herein suggests that pharmaceutical companies’
ability to advertise should be revoked. As Congressman
Daniel Lipinski said, “I am not looking to infringe upon any
company’s right to advertise, only to help assure that the
American taxpayers are not subsidizing these industries in
our health care system.”15
The First Amendment protects the pharmaceutical industry’s commercial free speech and right to advertise, and
prevents Congress from either imposing content- and

12. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40590, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 3 (2009) [hereinafter THAUL, CRS
REPORT], available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40590_20090520.pdf
(Members of the 111th Congress have indicated interest in DTC advertising in
the context of drug safety, tax treatment of advertising expenses, risk communication, and general FDA-activity authority and oversight, sometimes in the
context of broader discussions of health care costs and reform.”).
13. H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred for a direct-to-consumer
advertisement of a prescription drug”); S. 2842, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that
“[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . for expenses relating to direct to consumer
advertising in any media for the sale and use of prescription pharmaceuticals
for any taxable year”); S. 2873, 111th Cong. (2009) (same). Some of the proposed legislation, such as the Protecting Americans from Drug Marketing Act of
2009, proposed revoking tax deductions for all pharmaceutical advertising and
promotion. H.R. 3979, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be
allowed . . . for expenses relating to advertising or promoting the sale and use of
prescription pharmaceuticals for any taxable year” and defining “advertising or
promoting” to include “direct to consumer advertising in any media and any activity designed to promote the use of prescription pharmaceutical directed to
providers or others who may make decisions about the use or prescription
pharmaceuticals”); S. 1763, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); H.R. 2917, 111th Cong.
(2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . with respect to (1) any
advertisement primarily for purpose of promoting the sale or use of any prescribed drug”).
14. H.R. 2917; John Eggerton, Health Care Bill Won’t End Tax Deductions
for Prescription Drug Ads, BENTON FOUND. (July 15, 2009), http://www.benton.
org/node/26474.
15. Letter from Representative Daniel Lipinski to Representative Charles
B. Rangel and Representative Dave Camp (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Lipinski
Letter]. For more information on Congressman Daniel Lipinski, see his website, http://www.lipinski.house.gov/.
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speaker-based restrictions 16 or prohibiting industry from
spending on DTCA. Also, as previously mentioned, DTCA
proponents present several compelling arguments more thoroughly discussed below. It is not necessary, however, to
continue to allow tax deductions for DTCA in order to maintain those benefits and the constitution does not require the
continued allowance of a tax deduction. The arguments for
disincentivizing DTCA apply regardless of the content. The
focus is on the listener, not the speaker. The tendency of
drug advertising to mislead merely provides a facially-neutral
justification for revoking the deductions.17
The Tax Code is regularly and frequently used for
social engineering to affect non-tax behaviors.18 Congress allows tax breaks for actions or behaviors they want to
encourage and denies them, or imposes sin taxes for those
they wish to discourage or believe have low social value.19
Even constitutionally important topics such as religious donations and gun purchases may be taxed, or exempted, by
legislative decision. Here, forcing the pharmaceutical industry to internalize the full cost of advertising by removing the
subsidy may encourage them to consider more carefully
whether their ads’ content complies with FDA regulations
aimed at accurate portrayals of the drugs. Thereby, Congress
could reduce DTCA without violating the First Amendment
through outright bans or restrictions based on an ad’s content
or speaker. Further, removing tax deductions also results in
administrative simplification and is therefore a preferred
means of attempting to address non-tax behaviors. 20 One
such bill was estimated to raise approximately $37 billion in
revenue, which would not prevent the industry from advertis16. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (“State[s] may
not seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by
prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading advertisements that contain impressive endorsements or catchy jingles. That [a s]tate finds expression too persuasive
does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”).
17. Advertising pharmaceuticals directly to consumers is suspect regardless
of who is responsible for the advertisement. Particularly in light of Sorrell,
Congress must be wary of focusing on a particular viewpoint or speaker. See id.
at 2663–64.
18. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 1251.
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (2006).
20. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004) [hereinafter Weisbach &
Nussim, Tax and Spending].
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ing, but could help cover the cost of other government programs and likely reduce the overall prominence of DTCA.21
Thus, removing the tax deductions for DTCA is constitutionally permissible, properly aligned with public policy,22 and
Congress could remove the deductions.
This Article first discusses the factual and legal background leading up to the proposed DTCA tax deduction
removal, including: a brief history of DTCA regulation, pharmaceutical industry promotion and its effects, the relevant
IRC provisions and constitutional limits on Congress’ power.
Next, this Article examines the legal and policy reasons why
the removal of the tax deductions is advisable and permissible. Specifically, the removal would not infringe upon the
First Amendment-protected commercial free speech, even under heightened-scrutiny as recently applied in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.23 In Sorrell, the Court maintained that regulatory
differences between industries would still survive a constitutional challenge if there was reason to believe that fraud was
more likely in one industry.24 The Court also suggested that
it might be more flexible with respect to consumer protection
matters.25 This reasoning should apply to the revocation of
deductions for DTCA which generally does not explain alternative therapies and may interfere with the doctor-patient
relationship leading to excess prescribing, thereby contributing to the cost of health care without a correspondingly
healthier population. 26 Additionally, Congress has disallowed, and the Supreme Court has approved, the revocation
of deductions in many other instances as within Congress’
broad authority under the Sixteenth Amendment to both tax
the public and revoke deductions.27 Further, lobbying, which
21. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, House Considering $37 Billion Drug Tax, Rangel
Says, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aeEJZicjYE60.
22. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–53.
23. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
24. Id. at 2672.
25. Id.
26. See Walker, supra note 6 at 1251–53; RxP Weekly Reader: Bailout Edition, POSTSCRIPT (Oct. 2, 2008), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/
?p=223 (“The FDA has warned five drug makers about false or misleading advertisements of five ADHD drugs, according to the Bureau of National Affairs
Health Care Daily Report.”).
27. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983) (approving removal of tax exempt status); New Colonial Ice Co.
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like DTCA occurs in the ordinary course of business and aims
to persuade people, is specifically not tax-exempt due to Congress’ concern over “undue influence[.]”28 Yet Congress allows
full tax deductions for DTCA.
This Article also addresses why implementing a disincentive through the IRC would be preferable to increasing FDA
regulation. First, utilizing the IRC would be more practical
and involve fewer administrative costs. Second, FDA faces
constitutional limitations on its ability to monitor advertisements’ content. Finally, this Article acknowledges several
potential problems with the deductions’ removal and offers
that while a complete removal is preferred, Congress should
in the alternative consider instituting a cap on the amount
deductible for DTCA spending.
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS AND LAW

A. A Brief History of DTCA Regulation
Richard G. Frank, Professor of Health Economics at Harvard Medical School, defines DTCA as “any promotional effort
by a pharmaceutical company to present prescription drug information to the general public in the lay media.”29 This “
includes advertisements targeted toward consumers through
magazines, newspapers, television, radio, and outdoor advertising.”30 DTCA encompasses three categories: help-seeking
ads, reminder ads, and product-claim ads.31 Help-seeking ads
aim to get viewers to see their doctor about a particular condition, but do not mention any specific drug or treatment.32
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181,
192 (2008) (“noting the familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of
legislative grace” (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84
(1992) (internal quotations omitted)).
28. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried
About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 496 (2008) [hereinafter Mayer, Lobbying].
29. Michael S. Wilkes, Robert A. Bell & Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-ToConsumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, And Implications, 19
HEALTH AFF. 110, 112 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/19/2/110.full.pdf.
30. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 4 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/
rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378.
31. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5.
32. Id. at 4. Please note that these ads tend to be coordinated by the company to coincide with heavy marketing to doctors about a particular drug. U.S.
GEN’L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF
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Reminder ads state the name of the drug—but do not discuss
the condition it treats or make health claims—and the FDA
does not require full risk disclosure.33 Finally, product-claim
ads include both the drug’s name and therapeutic claims and
must include full risk information.34
In recognition of the weaknesses of the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906 and Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics
Act of 1938 to address advertising, Congress passed the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments. These amendments, directed
at advertising to physicians, transferred regulatory authority
for pharmaceutical marketing from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to FDA.35 These amendments required that
ads not be false or misleading, present a fair balance of the
drug’s risks and benefits, contain facts relevant to the advertised and approved use, list contraindications, and be
submitted to FDA upon publication.36 DTCA first attracted
the FDA’s attention in the early 1980s.37 Following a brief
voluntary moratorium to study the practice, FDA deemed the
1960s regulations regarding physician advertising adequate
to apply to DTCA.38 As a result of the cumbersome summary
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 11 (Oct. 2002) (stating
that “DTC advertising is concentrated among a small number of drugs for
chronic conditions and many of these same drugs are also promoted to physicians, both factors that may lead to increased sales.”).
33. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5. The Report also notes that
these ads are primarily directed towards providers who already have a base
knowledge of the product. Id.
34. Id. at 5.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).
36. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of regulation, see Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability of Traditional Principles of Law in
the Age of Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333,
336–40 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Viability]; THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra
note 12, at 8–14.
37. Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491–92 (1999) [hereinafter Pines, DTC
History]; see also Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 336–37 (stating that “
[c]ompanies that sell medications have advertised their products directly to consumers since the beginning of medicine”).
38. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 492; Prescription Drug Promotion:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce & Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter Ostrove Testimony], available at http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Testimony/ucm115206.htm (statement of Nancy M. Ostrove, Ph.D.,
Deputy Director, Food & Drug Admin.) (“On September 9, 1985, FDA withdrew
the moratorium in a Federal Register (FR) Notice (50 FR 36677), which stated
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requirements, these regulations effectively prohibited broadcast DTCA.39
Interestingly, one study conducted by the FDA in the
1980s, which in-part led to the allowance of DTCA, found that
consumers retained more information regarding the drug’s
benefits than its risks, and that print ads are relatively more
effective than broadcast ones at conveying risk information.40
Yet, the FDA deemed that presenting only a “fair balance” of
the risks and benefits was necessary to inform consumers effectively.41 Other than a January 2009 guidance regarding
what device manufacturers, drug manufacturers or representatives may disseminate regarding off-label usage, 42 the
regulations have remained relatively constant and there remains no distinction between the FDA’s regulations for
physician and consumer advertising.43
Initially, the FDA did not allow product-specific
advertisements.44 Drug companies could either advertise
symptoms with a message for consumers to see their doctor or
mention the name of a product, but could not indicate its
purpose.45 For example, these regulations permitted a commercial advertising the prescription drug Claritin, featuring
only a singer crooning about “ blue skies ” and a “ kind
voice instruct[ing] the viewer to ‘see your doctor about
Claritin.’ ” 46 Incidentally, this ad does not educate the public
that the ‘current regulations governing prescription drug advertising provide
sufficient safeguards to protect consumers.’ ” ).
39. See Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38.
40. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 492; see also Joel J. Davis, Consumers’ Preferences for the Communication of Risk Information in Drug
Advertising, 26 HEALTH AFF. 863, 863–64 (2007) (citing Kathryn Aikin, The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising on the PhysicianPatient Relationship (Sept. 22, 2003)).
41. The FTC has also recognized potential problems with the conveyance of
risk information to consumers in advertisements. See FTC Staff Provides
Comments to FDA on Direct-to-Consumer Drug and Device Ads, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (May 12, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/dtcdrugs.shtm.
42. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND
MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES
OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.
htm.
43. See Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38.
44. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 494.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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regarding a disease or treatment thereby failing to satisfy the
pharmaceutical industry’s primary justification for DTCA.
Rather than educate the public, the message appeals to
the individual’s emotions.47 Calm, cloudless, blue skies present a soothing image and a carefree outlook.
The
advertisement, for an allergy medication, could just as easily
promote a statin or antipsychotic drug. These advertisements
grab viewers’ attention, but not because they suffer from a
debilitating allergy. Curious, the viewer will ask his doctor
and as a result may discover some low-grade allergy.48 In
American culture, with the promotion of perfection and quickfixes, those with very mild symptoms would likely disregard
the side effects and opt to take the drug when no treatment or
a generic, cheaper drug would also suffice. In 1995, “
[c]oncerned that consumers were confused by the choppy nature of broadcast DTC advertising,” the FDA held a “hearing
on the putative risks and benefits of easing its regulation”
and in 1997 began to allow product-specific advertisements.49
Simultaneously, the FDA also released the “Guidance for
Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements.”50
For print ads, the guidance still required a “brief summary”
listing all the risks in the drug’s prescribing information and
at least one FDA-approved use.51 Alternatively, recognizing
that the not-so-brief summary information presented an insurmountable challenge in a 30- or 60-second commercial, the
FDA eased the requirements for broadcast ads.52 This change
allowed industry to include only an “adequate provision” with
a “major statement” of the most important risk information
that informs viewers or listeners where to find the full FDA-

47. See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, Editorial, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising—
Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 525 (2002).
48. According to Claratin’s website, about fifty million Americans are affected by allergies. Questions & Answers, CLARITIN, http://www.claritin.com/
claritin/learn/questions-answers.jspa#question4 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
49. Jeremy A. Greene & David Herzberg, Hidden in Plain Sight: Marketing
Prescription Drugs to Consumers in the Twentieth Century, 100 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 793, 800 (2010).
50. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125064.pdf [hereinafter FDA
1999 GUIDANCE]; see also Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38.
51. FDA 1999 GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 1.
52. Id.
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approved prescribing information.53 In the wake of the DTCA
regulatory relaxation, the pharmaceutical industry spends
the majority of its DTCA budget on television commercials.54
In 2004, FDA issued a draft Guidance for Industry entitled “ Brief Summary: Disclosing Risk Information in
Consumer-Directed Print Advertisements.” 55 The guidance
again distinguishes between print and broadcast advertisements, requiring a brief summary for print ads, but not for
broadcast ads. This, however, may be a distinction without
a difference.56 While the guidance “strongly encourages the
use of consumer-friendly language in all consumer-directed
materials,” the “FDA cannot object . . . solely on the basis that
the risk information is not presented in consumer-friendly
language.”57 Accordingly, to satisfy the brief summary requirement many manufacturers include the full FDAapproved labeling. 58 Nevertheless, as the FDA astutely
points out, providing the full labeling information “is less
than optimal.”59 In effect, the FDA admits that while this ap53. Id. at 2.
54. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS 3 (2009) [hereinafter CBO REPORT]; Peter Lurie, DTC Advertising
Harms Patients and Should Be Tightly Regulated, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 444,
444 (2009) (describing the FDA’s removal of the brief summary requirement as
the “regulatory change that produced the growth in DTC advertising”); Caroline
L. Nadal, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements in the New
Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 451, 479–
80 (2001) (explaining that as result of the FDA “relax[ing] its guidelines for
product-specific television and radio ads . . . . DTC marketing [grew] exponentially with pharmaceutical manufacturers spending almost $1.9 billion on DTC
advertisements in 1999, more than triple what they spent in 1996”); Shannon
Pettypiece, Less Sex, Rock-n-Roll as Drugmakers React to FDA TV Ad Scrutiny,
(Jan.
27,
2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news
BLOOMBERG
?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVe6AAgRw_0Y.
55. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BRIEF SUMMARY:
DISCLOSING
RISK
INFORMATION
IN
CONSUMER-DIRECTED
PRINT
ADVERTISEMENTS (2004) [hereinafter FDA 2004 DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformatio
n/Guidances/ucm069984.pdf. While the FDA refers to the guidance as a “draft,”
it reflects the Administration’s current practice. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra
note 12, at 11.
56. See, e.g., DDMAC Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm090308.htm (last updated June 18, 2009) (The “FDA has also heard concerns about the lack of value
of the required information [in the brief summary] from some individuals and
groups.”).
57. FDA 2004 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 1.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 2.
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proach complies with the regulations, it fails to convey the information necessary to educate consumers appropriately. 60
Thus, the additional brief summary requirement in print ads
does not prove any more effective in communicating appropriate use, benefit, and risk information to consumers.
In 2006, Congress amended the Lanham Act designed to
prevent false advertising claims.61 The Act provides, in part,
a civil penalty for anyone who “in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities.”62 The statute further allows for “action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”63
Congress also addressed DTCA in the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA).64 First,
the FDAAA authorized the FDA to charge industry a fee to
review DTCA prior to publication in order to fund the additional staff essential to that task. 65 In January of 2008,
however, the FDA announced it would not implement this
program.66 Second, the FDAAA authorized the FDA to require submission of television ads at least forty-five days
before their airdate, after which the Secretary may recommend, but not require or actually make, changes to the
advertisement.67 This expanded authority has also not been
utilized. Third, the FDAAA sets forth civil penalties for the
60. Id. (“Although this approach complies with the brief summary requirement, FDA believes it is less than optimal for consumer-directed print
advertisements because many consumers do not have the technical background
to understand this information. Moreover, the volume of the material, coupled
with the format in which it is presented (i.e., very small print and sophisticated
medical terminology) discourages its use and makes the information less comprehensible to consumers. In general, FDA believes that exhaustive lists of
minor risks distract from and make it difficult to comprehend and retain information on the more important risks. FDA also believes that information
intended for a consumer should optimally be communicated in language fully
understandable by a lay reader and presented in an easily readable format.”).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110–85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
65. 21 U.S.C.A. § 379h-1.
66. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008).
67. 21 U.S.C.A. § 353b.
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sponsoring of false or misleading DTCA. 68 Finally, the
FDAAA required all DTCA to include a statement encouraging the reporting of negative side effects.69
FDA only reviews ads once published, but even then does
not review all ads.70 When the FDA discovers a violation,
their enforcement options include: sending an untitled letter
or a warning letter, imposing a civil monetary penalty, criminally prosecuting the company, seizing a product, or
withdrawing their approval for sale.71 Upon finding a problem with an ad, the FDA typically responds first with an
untitled letter, also known as a notice of violation, then a
warning letter, and finally an injunction.72 Despite the FDA’s
contention that warning letters serve as a sufficient threat to
prevent the need for further action, their prevalence indicates
that by themselves they are an insufficient regulatory tool.73
B. Pharmaceutical Industry Promotion and Its Effects
Following the 1997 DTCA regulatory relaxation, promotional spending across the pharmaceutical industry increased
from $11.4 billion in 1996 to $29.9 billion in 2005.74 In 2008,
the pharmaceutical industry spent $20.5 billion, placing them
68. 21 U.S.C.A. § 333. The FDAAA established that the maximum penalty
would be $250,000 for the first offence, and $500,000 for any subsequent offence
in a three-year period. However, the repeated dissemination of the same ad
only counts as one violation.
69. 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(n). The statute requires that the following statement
be included: “You are encouraged to report negative side effects of prescription
drugs to the FDA. Visit www.fda.gov/medwatch, or call 1-800-FDA-1088.” Id.
70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-54, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING 5 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf.
71. Id. at 11.
72. DONNA U. VOGT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32853, DIRECT-TOCONSUMER ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 29 (2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL328530325
2005.pdf (stating that “FDA believes that the . . . warning letter is a powerful
tool in its regulatory arsenal”).
73. See Warning Letters, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last updated Oct. 4,
2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 21–
22 (2002) [hereinafter FDA OVERSIGHT], available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03177.pdf.
74. Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 673 (2007) [hereinafter
Donohue, A Decade of DTCA], available at http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa070502.
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second only to the auto industry in advertising.75 The rate of
increase in promotional spending has out-paced spending on
research and development.76 Currently, the United States
spends 17.3% of the Gross Domestic Product on healthcare,
outpatient pharmaceuticals accounting for approximately
10% of those costs. 77 While DTCA, at about $4.2 billion,
represents only a small fraction of pharmaceutical industry
spending, it is continually expanding and, as proponents and
opponents of DTCA agree, effective.78
Despite attempts by the FDA to require a balanced portrayal of the risks and benefits of each drug, such a balance is
unlikely.79 The pharmaceutical industry has a clear financial
incentive to aggressively promote their products. Drug companies are for-profit businesses and spend billions each year
to advertise because the industry receives a high return on

75. Noreen O’Leary, Sen. Bill Nelson Backs off on Drug Ads, ADWEEK (Sept.
16, 2009), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/sen-bill-nelsonbacks-drug-ads-100360. This number actually represents a decline from the industry’s peak spending in 2006, which amounted to $5.2 billion. See CBO
REPORT, supra note 54, at 2. But see ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 122
(explaining that the exact amount spent yearly by industry is unclear, but
higher than they report).
76. GAO-07-54, supra note 9, at 5, 12; Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (explaining that “[s]pending by drug companies on consumer advertising has
quadrupled since 1996, even outpacing spending on research and development”);
FDA OVERSIGHT, supra note 73, at 9.
77. See Micah Hartman et al., Health Spending Growth at a Historic Low in
2008, 29 HEALTH AFF. 147, 148 exhibit 1 (2010).
78. See ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 123; Donohue, A Decade of
DTCA, supra note 74, at 675 (stating that at $4.2 billion “[i]n 2005, only 14% of
total industry expenditures on pharmaceutical promotion were devoted to such
advertising.”); Faith McLellan, US Government Report Released on Deceptive
Drug Advertisements, 360 LANCET 1951, 1951 (2002), available at
http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2802%29119477/fulltext (stating that every year approximately 8.5 million people request and
receive prescriptions as a result of DTCA).
79. Cf. Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial
Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 205
(2011). Sax found that even the research used to support drugs tends to be
slanted. Id.
Previous studies demonstrate that industry publications have a bias in
that they tend to report positive results of clinical trials. This is not
surprising because industry has a profit-seeking motive and companies
are likely to closely monitor the progress and process of a research
study in such a way that adverse results may be suppressed leading to
the publication of biased results.
Id.
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this investment.80 Studies have shown that each $1 spent on
advertising yields between about $4.20 and $6.50 in drug
sales.81 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that
“the 10 [drugs] with the highest DTC expenditures in 2008
accounted for 30 percent of expenditures for DTC advertising
industrywide. ” 82 This increase in drug use and profits,
however, does not correlate with a healthier population. 83
Rather, pharmaceutical advertising results in the overuse of
brand-name prescription drugs and more expensive treatments instead of equally effective, cheaper options, thereby
raising the cost of healthcare for everyone.84
“The great majority of DTC ads are for very expensive
me-too drugs that require a lot of pushing because there is no
good reason to think they are any better than drugs already
on the market.”85 DTCA also often aims to raise the signifi80. Terzian, supra note 3, at 166–67; see also Schwartz, Viability, supra
note 36, at 335; Lichtenberg & Duflos, supra note 7, at 12 (stating that “
marketing has a significant impact on utilization”); QIUPING GU ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 42, PRESCRIPTION DRUG
USE CONTINUES TO INCREASE: U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG DATA FOR 2007–2008 1
(2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf.
81. Lipinski Letter, supra note 15; THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at
25. But see Heavy Drug Ad Spending Doesn’t Pay Off, MARKETINGCHARTS (Apr.
12, 2010), http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/heavy-drug-ad-spendingdoesnt-pay-off-12554/ (stating that advertising spending does not necessarily
correlate with profits).
82. CBO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4–5 (discussing the drugs in the CBO’s
data set); see also Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 676 (“The 20
drugs with the highest spending made up 54.4% of total industry spending on
advertising in 2005 . . . .”).
83. See, e.g., THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1, 21 (noting that
DTCA “are susceptible to marketing needs that interfere with objective presentations” and “the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs . . . found . . . that 44% of promotional material to physicians
‘would lead to improper prescribing,’ ” and recommended that providers “remain
vigilant to ensure that DTC advertising does not promote expectations”); Jared
A. Favole, FDA Warns Drug Companies On Promotional Material, DOW JONES
NEWSWIRES, Feb. 3, 2010 (noting warnings issued to major pharmaceutical
companies Eli Lilly & Co., United Therapeutics Corp. and Sanofi-Aventis SA for
misleading promotional materials). But see generally, Frank R. Lichtenberg,
Effects of New Drugs on Overall Health Spending: Frank Lichtenberg Responds,
26 HEALTH AFF. 887 (2007) (finding “that, in general, using newer drugs has
reduced nondrug costs more than it has increased drug costs . . .”).
84. See, e.g., Barry Meier et al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensifies
Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 1, at 1 (explaining how
Celebrex and Vioxx costing $2 or $3 per pill, were prescribed to many patients
could have received the same effect, more safely, from over the counter drugs for
only pennies per pill).
85. ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 124.
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cance of a relatively innocuous temporary problem to something far more serious. For instance, “heartburn is elevated
to gastrointestinal reflux disease, with the implication that it
needs to be treated to prevent serious complications.”86 Once “
people [are] convinced they have a treatable medical condition, then it is an easy step to sell them drugs to treat it.”87
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry optimizes the
effect of DTCA by first heavily advertising to physicians.88
While industry and DTCA supporters refer to these efforts as
education, Marcia Angell, former New England Journal of
Medicine Editor-in-Chief, noted the fact that this “ ‘ education’
comes out of the drug companies’ marketing budgets . . . .
should tell you what is really going on.”89
The for-profit pharmaceutical companies consider their
promotional activities’ potential benefits and liabilities. Even
if a company knows they will have to pay a penalty after, in
light of the expected revenue resulting from every dollar
spent on DTCA, the risk may be worth it to the company.90 In
tort cases, manufacturers will generally be held directly liable
to consumers for failure to warn. By contrast, as a result of
the learned intermediary doctrine, premised on the notion
that physicians are in the best position to analyze an individual patient’s particular circumstances and the drug’s risks
and benefits, pharmaceutical manufacturers are shielded

86. Angell, Relationships, supra note 8.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 679 (explaining
that “PhRMA, the industry trade group, has recommended that manufacturers
delay such campaigns for new drugs until after health professionals have been
sufficiently educated, although no details have been provided on how long a period was deemed necessary”); ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 126. For
more information on drug detailing, see, e.g., Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth
Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
785, 808–09 (2005); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 377–79 (2000).
89. ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 135 (the comment was made by
Angell in the context of discussing “educational meetings arranged by pharmaceutical companies for physicians,” but similarly applies to DTCA).
90. See Ozlem A. Bordes, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-toConsumer Advertising: Should the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Be Shielded
from Liability?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 267–70 (2004); Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 356 & n.121 (explaining the doctrine and noting that it has
been abolished, at least with respect to DTCA, in New Jersey, West Virginia,
etc.).

SPEISER/OUTTERSON FINAL

2012]

DEDUCTIONS FOR DRUG ADS?

2/22/2012 9:55:44 PM

469

from direct liability to consumers.91 Practically, however, the
doctrine effectively allows the pharmaceutical industry to
blame doctors for the manufacturer’s inadequate warnings.92
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme
Court revoked the doctrine’s applicability for DTCA, recognizing that DTCA fundamentally impacts the doctor-patient
relationship and therefore the initial policy justifications for
the doctrine no longer applied.93 Since most states have not
adopted a DTCA exception, industry shields itself from liability in many cases and does not calculate the full extent of
potential harm from their advertisements.94
Similarly, in two recent cases, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth95 and
Pliva v. Mensing,96 the Supreme Court held that federal laws
preempt products liability cases against vaccine and
pharmaceutical manufacturers, respectively. These two
cases represent a departure from the 2009 decision in Wyeth
v. Levine in which the Court held that federal law did not
preempt state strict liability tort suits.97 In declining to find
preemption, the Levine court considered the benefits of state
tort litigation including “help[ing] the FDA in its oversight
function by revealing important and previously unknown information about product-related risks, especially during the

91. Id.
92. See Bordes, supra note 90, at 278; Erin Lenhardt, Why So Glum? Toward a Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-To-Consumer Advertising
and the Well-Being of the Mentally Ill Consumers It Targets, 15 HEALTH MATRIX
165, 166 (2005) [hereinafter Lenhardt, Why So Glum?] (arguing that even physicians “sometimes do not realize the persuasive effect of the spin contained [in
drug advertisements]”).
93. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). Note also that
this decision follows Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass.
1991), in which the court in a footnote allowed for an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine anytime a manufacturer advertises directly to consumers.
Id. at 211 n.4. See also State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647
S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007) (rejecting the learned intermediary doctrine entirely,
but focusing on DTCA in particular).
94. But see Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 364–69 (arguing that creating a DTCA exception “represent[s] unsound policy”); Victor E. Schwartz et
al., West Virginia As a Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in
State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 778–82 (2009) (discussing West Virginia’s
2007 wholesale rejection of the learned intermediary doctrine and thereby placing it “firmly at odds with fundamental tort principles expressed in the Second
and Third Restatements”).
95. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
96. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
97. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
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postapproval [sic] period, and by deterring manufacturers
from acting irresponsibly and engaging in business tactics
aimed at increasing product sales at the expense of patient
safety.”98 Accordingly, raising costs associated which manufacturing and promotion of drugs may lead the industry to
more carefully consider the practice.
C. The Tax Code: A Potential Policy Lever for Congress
The Sixteenth Amendment broadly authorizes Congress
to tax incomes.99 Generally, the IRC taxes businesses and individuals only on net income. Accordingly, the IRC allows for
the deduction of numerous expenses to try to achieve that result, including “ordinary and necessary” business expenses.100
The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) definition of ordinary
corresponds with a common sense understanding of ordinary.
“An ordinary expense is one that is common and accepted in
your trade or business.”101 Necessary, on the other hand, is
defined as to not require the expense to be “indispensable,”
but rather “one that is helpful and appropriate for your trade
or business.”102 Unlike tax deductions for individuals, deductions for corporations do not phase out at any income
bracket.103
Despite the general deductible rule, a deduction is not a
matter of right. As courts have repeatedly stated, Congress
has the authority to tax gross income. In New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helvering, the Supreme Court refused to infer a deduction where Congress had not explicitly allowed one.104 As the
Court explained, “[w]hether and to what extent deductions
98. Aaron Kesselheim, Safety, Supply, and Suits — Litigation and the Vaccine Industry, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485, 1486 (2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1102182.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006).
101. Deducting Business Expenses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=109807,00.html (last updated
June 10, 2011) [hereinafter IRS Business Expenses]; see also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113–14 (1933); 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1 (2004).
102. IRS Business Expenses, supra note 101; Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
103. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (phasing out the allowance of a deduction for
personal exemptions when the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeds a certain amount); cf., e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (not providing any phase out amount for
allowable trade or business deductions).
104. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace.”105 IRC Section 162 exempts certain expenses as a means of regulating
and discouraging relevant non-tax behaviors.106 For instance,
neither treble damage payments under the antitrust laws,
nor certain foreign advertising expenses are deductible. 107
Additionally, home mortgages are deductible, but rental
payments are not and tax credits are given for installing solar
panels, but not for wood-burning stoves.108 Advertising in
general, however, is deductible.109 But expenses that may
produce a future benefit must be capitalized.110 The IRS,
however, allows for the deduction of advertising expenses despite the fact that a particular campaign may last several
years.111 Removing this deduction would increase the cost of
advertising thereby discouraging industry from advertising as
heavily.112 At the very least, it would cease the taxpayer subsidy of DTCA.
D. Objections to Removing the Tax Deductions
1. Policy: Unfair to the Drug Industry113
Proponents of DTCA defend the increase in prescription
drug spending and healthcare costs by arguing
that these practices lead to an overall healthier population.114
Specifically, DTCA increases consumer knowledge, encourages people to see their doctors by removing the stigma, leads

105. Id.
106. Walker, supra note 6, at 1257.
107. I.R.C. § 162(g), (j).
108. I.R.C. § 162.
109. Id.
110. I.R.C. § 263A.
111. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-20 (2004).
112. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1251 (explaining that the effect of certain
other disallowances of tax deduction “discourage[s] [the] disfavored activity”).
113. See Pat Kelly, DTC Advertising’s Benefits Far Outweigh Its Imperfections, HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.246.full.pdf+html.
114. See Kelly, supra note 113; Keeping Watch Over Direct-to-Consumer Ads,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/
ucm107170.htm (last updated Sept. 09, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Keeping Watch];
ADVERTISING
FED’N,
DTC
Prescription
Drug
Advertising,
AM.
http://www.aaf.org/default.asp?id=248 (last updated Sept. 2008); Peter J. Pitts,
Turning Point or Tipping Point: New FDA Draft Guidance and the Future of
DTC Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-259 (Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.health
affairs.org/content/suppl/2004/04/27/hlthaff.w4.259v1.DC1.
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to the diagnosis of more diseases, reminds patients to refill
and take their prescriptions, and helps individuals “achieve
the maximum degree of material satisfaction.”115 As many
have observed, however, while the consumer may be more informed after viewing an advertisement, they are not
necessarily better informed.116 In light of the frequency with
which FDA issues warning letters for failure to present a fair
balance of a drug’s risks and benefits, it is clear that the quality of the information conveyed leaves something to be
desired. Moreover, even when risks and benefits are evenly
presented, consumers retain more information regarding the
advantages than the side effects.117
Proponents also point out that advertising can lead to
lower drug prices.118 Even if advertising drives down its cost,
when a drug is unnecessary, that expenditure is wasteful.
Pharmaceutical companies are for-profit businesses; if advertising actually led to overall reduced costs, or more
specifically, did not help increase their profits, they would
stop advertising. As many economists have noted, the “recent
growth in DTC advertising has persuaded consumers to substitute new, more expensive drugs for older, lower-priced ones
”119 thereby increasing profits for industry.

115. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433
(1971); see also FDA Keeping Watch, supra note 114.
116. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
1456 (1999); but see Kathryn J. Aikin, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Drugs:
Physician
Survey
Preliminary
Results
(2003),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/UCM148277.pd
f (reporting physician survey results that most doctors found that DTCA did
help educate consumers about their health problems).
117. Louis A. Morris & Lloyd G. Millstein, Drug Advertising to Consumers:
Effects of Formats for Magazine and Television Advertisements, 39 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 497, 500 (1984).
118. See Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15
J.L. & ECON. 337, 344–45 (1972) (noting that advertising correlates with lower
prices).
119. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25 (citing Stephen Heffler et al.,
Health Spending Growth Up in 1999; Faster Growth Expected in The Future, 20
HEALTH AFF. 193 (2001)); see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 8 (explaining that DTCA promotes me-too drugs).
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2. First Amendment Limitations on Congressional
Power
Under the First Amendment, government may not
censor speech.120 The 1942 Supreme Court in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, however, held that the First Amendment protections did not extend to “purely commercial advertising.”121
Commercial speech, along with obscenity, fighting words, incitement, and defamation, remained unprotected as a result
of “low social value,” failure to “contribute to the exchange of
ideas and the search for truth, and because the social interests in order and morality outweigh any benefit that [it]
produce[s].”122
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted Valentine in Bigelow v. Virginia, revoking commercial
speech’s per se unprotected status.123 Justice Blackmun announced that “speech is not stripped of First Amendment
protection merely because it appears in [the] form [of commercial advertisements].”124 The Court further emphasized
the protection of commercial speech with respect to prescription drugs in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.125 Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun stated that “even if the First Amendment
were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could not say that the
free flow of information does not serve that goal.”126 Accordingly, economic motives are irrelevant and even “speech [that]
does no more than propose a commercial transaction” receives
First Amendment protection.127 Simultaneously, the Court
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Brienne T. Greiner, Tough Pill to Swallow: Does
the First Amendment Prohibit WV from Regulating Pharmaceutical Companies’
Advertising Expenses to Lower the Cost of Prescription Drugs, 109 W. VA. L.
REV. 107, 120–21 (2006).
121. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
122. Greiner, supra note 120, at 123.
123. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
124. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413
U.S. 376, 384 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964))
(“The fact that the particular advertisement . . . had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First
Amendment guarantees.”).
125. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
126. Id. at 765.
127. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385) (stating that “we
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stressed that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise,
has never been protected.” 128 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent,
however, astutely predicted the then-future problematic nature of DTCA that the majority had not anticipated.129
In 1980, the Supreme Court provided a test to determine
whether the government can regulate a particular instance of
commercial speech.130 Specifically, the Central Hudson test
states that protected speech must: (1) “concern lawful activity
and not be misleading”; (2) concern a substantial “asserted
governmental interest”; (3) “directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted”; and (4) “not [be] more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.”131 Applying that
test, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court
struck down a provision of the FDA Modernization Act that
required physicians and pharmacists to refrain from advertising in order to compound a drug.132
The Supreme Court remains steadfast in holding drug
advertising constitutional and preventing states and Congress from regulating its content. Most recently, in Sorrell v.
IMS Health, the Court struck down a Vermont law restricting
the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal
the prescribing practices of individual doctors. In enacting
this law, “ Vermont articulated three objectives: avoiding
harm to the public health associated with the overprescription of new drugs, controlling costs by stemming practices
that promote expensive, branded drugs over generics, and
protecting physicians’ privacy.”133 The Court found pharmamay assume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one”).
128. Id. at 771.
129. Id. at 788 (“In the case of ‘our’ hypothetical pharmacist, he may now
presumably advertise not only the prices of prescription drugs, but may attempt
to energetically promote their sale so long as he does so truthfully. Quite consistently with Virginia law requiring prescription drugs to be available only
through a physician, ‘our’ pharmacist might run any of the following representative advertisements in a local newspaper: ‘Pain getting you down? Insist that
your physician prescribe Demerol. You pay a little more than for aspirin, but
you get a lot more relief’ ‘Can’t shake the flu? Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today.’ ‘Don’t spend another sleepless night. Ask your
doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay.’ ” ).
130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
131. Id. at 566.
132. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002); THAUL,
CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 15–16 & n.51.
133. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Pre-
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ceutical data mining to be protected speech in aid of pharmaceutical advertising. 134 The statute at issue in Sorrell
imposed both content and speaker-based restrictions by prohibiting the sale of physician prescribing patterns to
pharmaceutical manufacturers and detailers for marketing
purposes, but allowing the sale of the same records to certain
other entities. While the Court determined heightenedscrutiny to be the correct standard, it simultaneously held
that the statute failed even under the intermediate Central
Hudson test. In another decision only days later, however,
the Supreme Court held that all content-based restrictions
trigger strict scrutiny,135 thereby leaving the exact level of
scrutiny to be applied in future cases unclear.136
In the wake of this ruling and as noted in Justice
Breyer’s dissent, the Court has opened the gates to the possibility of striking down most FDA regulations since they
generally discriminate based on conduct and speaker.137 For
instance, off-label promotion by industry members, currently
prohibited by FDA regulations faced a First Amendment challenge by Allergan several years ago. While Allergan dropped
the claim and that case ultimately settled, 138 in light of
Sorrell’s application of heightened scrutiny to content- and
speaker-based regulations, the regulation would likely not
survive today. Thus, there are significant constitutional concerns with strong content-based limitations on DTCA.139
scribing Data for Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011).
134. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011).
135. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
136. Mello & Messing, supra note 133, at 1250 (“[T]he term ‘heightened scrutiny’ is critical and pointedly ambiguous. It might be a mere synonym for the
midlevel scrutiny applied under the Central Hudson test — but it might mean
far more. In a prior opinion, Justice Kennedy cited First Amendment cases that
applied ‘strict scrutiny,’ the most rigorous kind, as examples of ‘heightened
scrutiny,’ suggesting that he may have intended this meaning when he used the
same term in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. . . . Sorrell might thus portend that
commercial speech will no longer receive lesser protection than political and social speech.” (internal citations omitted)).
137. See Kevin Outterson, Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public
Health Regulation, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. e13, e13(2) (2011); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct.
at 2676–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Settlement Agreement between United States, et al. and Allergan, Inc. ¶
19 (Sept. 1, 2010); see also Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Allergan
Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label
Promotion of Botox, No. 10-988 (Sept. 1, 2010) available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html.
139. See Sax, supra note 79, at 216 (advocating to institute the content-based
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II. DISCUSSION
The problem with DTCA has “attracted enough congressional attention to warrant at least six bills in the 110th
Congress as well as concerns from members in the 111th.”140
Among these bills is the Say No to Drug Ads Act, which
aimed to alter the IRC such that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred for a direct-toconsumer advertisement of a prescription drug.”141 Part II
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of this particular
strategy concerning DTCA.
As Representative Daniel Lipinski, sponsor of one of the
bills to revoke the DTCA tax deduction, said, “I am not looking to infringe upon any company’s right to advertise, only to
help assure that the American taxpayers are not subsidizing
these industries in our health care system.”142 By allowing a
tax deduction for DTCA, the government is reducing the cost
of advertising and encouraging DTCA spending. 143 “[The
pharmaceutical companies] already have plenty of incentives
to spend that money . . . . As Congress looks for ways to repair our health care system, this is one simple reform that
ought not to be overlooked.”144
Increasing the financial burden on industry marketing
may reduce the frequency and enhance the accuracy of DTCA
content since there will be a greater monetary loss to companies when they are forced to cease broadcasting a misleading
ad.145 The recent Pfizer marketing abuse resulting in a multibillion-dollar fine further supports the need to encourage
Truth in Marketing Act).
140. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
141. H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009).
142. Lipinski Letter, supra note 15. But see Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–
52 (arguing that “the disallowance on ‘public policy’ grounds of deductions . . . is
best understood as a response to an appearance of subsidy” and noting that not
all deductions are actually subsidies).
143. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–52 (arguing that “the disallowance on
‘public policy‘ grounds of deductions . . . is best understood as a response to an
appearance of subsidy” and noting that not all deductions are actually subsidies).
144. Lipinski Introduces Bill to End Tax Break for Marketing and Advertising By Drug Companies, CONGRESSMAN DAN LIPINSKI (June 17, 2009),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110406164620/http://www.lipinski.house.gov/index
.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=917&Itemid=9 (internal quotations
omitted).
145. Cf. The distortions to the healthcare market as a result of insurance
such that consumers do not fully appreciate the cost of their decisions.
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accurate advertising from the outset.146 Moreover, eliminating the DTCA tax deduction would not prevent the
pharmaceutical industry, ranked by Fortune magazine as one
of the top thirty most profitable industries in 2009,147 from
advertising.148 Thus, any benefits from advertising would be
maintained while decreasing negative effects.
Removing the tax deduction would not cease all DTCA by
creating a practical barrier. Rather, the removal would serve
three main purposes. First, it would signal Congressional
unwillingness to subsidize DTCA through the Tax Code. Second, making advertising more expensive would alter the drug
companies’ cost-benefit analysis as to how much money to
spend on DTCA, likely leading them to cut back and reduce
the overall quantity of DTCA. Third, the removal of the deductions may find favor with the public by resulting in
increased revenue of approximately $37 billion over ten
years.149
A. Revocation of Tax Deductions is Constitutional
Even in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Sorrell, which “expand[ed] the First Amendment’s reach
and power to strike down government regulation of health
care information[,]”150 revocation of the deductions for DTCA
remains constitutionally viable. As Justice Kennedy noted in
writing for the majority, Sorrell did not alter the proposition
that “a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one
industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in
its view greater there.”151 Rather, the Court focused on con146. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/03/business/03health.html; see also Kesselheim, supra note 98, at 1486.
147. Global 500 2009: Top Performers — Fast Growing Industries: Growth in
Revenues, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009
/performers/industries/fastgrowers/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (ranking the
pharmaceutical industry number six in growth in profits and number twentyseven in growth in revenue).
148. See, e.g., Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (explaining that pharmaceutical
companies earn approximately $4.20 for each dollar spent on advertising and “
neither need nor deserve to have their marketing expenditures subsidized by
taxpayers”).
149. Rich Thomaselli, Industry Mobilizes to Fight Off Congress’ $37 Billion
Ad Tax, ADVERTISING AGE (June 22, 2009), http://adage.com/article/news/bigpharma-media-cos-4a-s-defend-threat-dtc/137476/.
150. Outterson, supra note 137, at e13(1).
151. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v.
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tent- and speaker-based restrictions in access to or use of
information. Unlike the Vermont statute in Sorrell,152 revocation of the deductions for DTCA does not impose a content- or
viewpoint-based restriction since it neither affects the industry’s use of, or access to, information nor pertains to the
content of its advertisements. Drug manufacturers can still
publish the exact same advertisements that could be published with a deduction. Conversely, imposing a direct
regulation on truthful, non-misleading DTCA would not likely
survive a First Amendment challenge.
Revoking the deductions also does not impose speakerbased discrimination since it would apply to all DTCA, regardless of the person or entity engaging in the practice or his
motivation. While the revocation may have the effect of discriminating based on speaker since only pharmaceutical
manufacturers engage in DTCA, the revocation does not
involve the facial discrimination apparent in the Vermont
statute.
Another reason to differentiate DTCA from the data mining at issue in Sorrell is that data mining provides useful,
educational information to doctors.153 While DTCA also purports to educate, it targets consumers whose protection
presents a greater concern to the court. As Kevin Outterson
explained in his recent article in the New England Journal of
Medicine, the Sorrell Court also indicated that the constitutional standard applied to regulations aimed at protecting
consumers might be more relaxed.154 According to Outterson,
this means that:
FDA regulation of [DTCA] could be given more leeway
than marketing to physicians, especially if medical education programs focused on helping physicians evaluate such
claims. Similarly, more leeway could be given under speCity of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992)).
152. Id. at 2663 (“Vermont’s law . . . has the effect of preventing detailers—
and only detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and informative manner.”).
153. Id. at 2683 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mello & Messing, supra note 133, at
1251.
154. Outterson, supra note 137, at e13(2) (“The First Amendment directs us
to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good . . . . These precepts apply
with full force when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of
‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.” (quoting Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at
2671)).
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cial circumstances, such as if the FDA restricted [DTCA]
as part of a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy.155

While Congress cannot limit protected speech, they are
not required to ease its financial burden. In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]n
an area as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress
vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new
problems.”156 It is “well established that Congress is not required to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights
through the allowance of tax deductions, and may withdraw
such subsidies if it chooses to do so.”157 Tax deductions are
matters of legislative grace158 and Congress “[u]nquestionably
. . . has the power to condition, limit, or deny deductions.”159
For instance, the IRC specifically exempts deductions for
certain political expenditures, despite First Amendment implications.160 This section also differentiates between local
and non-local legislation. Note, however, that Congress
would not be permitted to revoke deductions only for a particular political party. Such a restriction would be an
impermissible speaker- and content-based restriction under
Sorrell.161 The IRC also excludes deductions for expenses related to a redemption, certain passive real estate
investments, net capital losses in excess of three thousand
155. Id.
156. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
157. Brief for Appellee at 28, Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-5097), 1999 WL 34835366 (citing Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983); Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)) (discussing tax deduction and exceptions). Also consider, Congress’ removal of lobbying, a protected speech, from
the class of deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses under the IRC
remains constitutional in the wake of the Bellotti decision. I.R.C. § 162(e)
(2006); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
158. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006); Bob Jones Univ., 461 at 574 (approving
removal of tax exempt status); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,
440 (1934); Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 192 (2008) (“noting the familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace” (citing
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted)).
159. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
160. I.R.C. § 162(e).
161. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (finding that the
Vermont Law violates the First Amendment since “[t]he State’s interest in burdening the speech of detailers . . . turns on nothing more than a difference of
opinion”).
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dollars, certain group health plans, and stock reacquisition, to
name just a few.162 Most importantly, Congress has exempted
certain foreign advertising expenses from the category of deductible expenses.163 In Bob Jones University, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had the power to revoke tax deductions on the basis of racial discrimination.164
The Supreme Court, however, has held that preventing
companies from spending money on protected speech violates
the First Amendment.165 In First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts state law
criminalizing contributions or expenditures by certain corporations for the purpose of influencing a vote.166 The Bellotti
Court stressed the importance of the “exacting scrutiny” applied to “legislative prohibition[s] . . . directed at speech itself
and speech on a public issue” since the First Amendment protects speech regardless of the source.167 Indeed, the Supreme
Court drew particular attention to advertising, reaffirming its
holding in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.168 Specifically,
the Court noted that “[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected . . . because it furthers the societal
interest in the ‘free flow of commercial information.’ ” 169 Congress has no authority to limit protected speech.170 While the
removal of the tax deductions may increase the cost of advertising and thereby reduce its prevalence, it does not prevent
manufacturers from spending money to exercise their First
Amendment right.
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision “
reflect[ing] its willingness to expand significantly the justifications for regulating campaign financing, the First

162. I.R.C. § 162(k), (l).
163. I.R.C. § 162(j).
164. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983); see also Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
165. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
166. Id. at 765. The Court also explained that the lower court erred in holding that “First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that
materially affect is [sic] business, property, or assets.” Id. at 767. Even if the
protections were limited to this subset, pharmaceutical advertising would still
be allowed. This Article, however, discusses this case to emphasize that the
amount of money a corporation may spend on advertising cannot be restricted.
167. Id. at 766.
168. Id. at 765–66.
169. Id. at 783.
170. Id. at 784–85.
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Amendment notwithstanding.”171 Professor Richard Briffault 172 observed that the Court reframed the issue of
regulating the finances away from “a threat to freedoms of
speech and association and therefore a challenge to constitutional values . . . [instead] giv[ing] great weight to the
interests in fair, informed democratic decision-making it
found to be advanced[.]” 173 This reasoning for increasing
regulations should similarly apply to DTCA. Rather than
promote, DTCA, facilitated by tax deductions, hinders the
free flow of information. DTCA influences consumers to pressure their over-burdened doctor whose reasoning cannot
compete with the alluring ads to prescribe a more expensive
medicine.174
B. Policy
1. Negative Effects of DTCA
In their comments on the 2004 FDA DTCA draft guidance, FTC noted “the important role that DTC advertising
can play in keeping consumers better-informed about their
healthcare and treatment options.”175 FTC highlighted the
171. Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1002 (2005) (discussing McConnell v.
FEC).
172. Professor Briffault is the Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation at Columbia Law School.
173. Polsky & Charles, supra note 171, at 1002 n.19 (citing Richard Briffault,
McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3
ELECTION L.J. 147, 148 (2004)).
174. See, e.g., Patrick Cohoon, An Answer to the Question Why the Time Has
Come to Abrogate the Learned Intermediary Rule in the Case of Direct-toConsumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1333, 1357
(2001) (“There is no justification for concluding that DTC advertising does not
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.”); Terzian, supra note 3, at 158 (“
Moreover, industry critics of DTC advertisements argue that the advertisements distort doctor-patient relationships and may actually increase the use of
prescription drugs.”); David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct to Consumer
Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 284 (2007) (stating that “doctors often succumb to patient pressure, or patients ‘doctor-shop’ until they find a
doctor willing to write the prescription the patient wants” and that “[m]edical
organizations generally see DTC ads as a threat to the doctor-patient relationship for just that reason”).
175. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., BUREAU OF ECON. & OFFICE OF POLICY
PLANNING OF THE FTC, DOCKET NO. 2004D-0042, IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST
FOR COMMENTS ON AGENCY DRAFT GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS REGARDING
CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION 13 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2004/05/040512dtcdrugscomment.pdf (emphasis added).
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importance of providing consumers with risk information
they can easily understand and “improv[ing] the facilitation of
truthful, non-misleading information.”176 Thus, FTC implicitly recognizes that DTCA, in its current state, fails to
promote public welfare as demonstrated by the industry’s repeated violations of FDA guidance.177
Improving consumer knowledge by providing information
through DTCA is an honorable, yet impractical, aspiration.
Drug companies often provide technically accurate information framed to mislead viewers.178 The general public with no
medical training cannot fully appreciate the implications of a
particular drug as presented by the pharmaceutical companies. 179 An FDA survey revealed that 75% of patients
overestimate drug’s efficacy based on DTCA.180 Many viewers
assume that advertisements are preapproved and all advertised drugs are “completely safe.”181 DTCA generally does not
list alternate treatment options or include the full list of potential side effects and consumers typically lack the
independent knowledge to appreciate an ad in its proper context.
Despite the instruction to viewers in every broadcast ad
to consult additional sources for the full list of side effects,
consumers are unlikely to comply. Rather than rationally
process the information that should be relevant, consumers
respond to the images designed to evoke a positive association
in the consumer’s mind. Alternatively, the ads sometimes
aim to incite fear in the viewer to make the viewer believe
that a relatively minor problem is a serious problem requiring
176. Id.
177. See sources cited supra notes 11, 73, 83, 146.
178. See, e.g., Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (“In health care reform we
should be striving to provide consumers with more information, but this information should be unbiased information that gives a clear understanding of the
choices available to them.”); see also Terzian, supra note 3, at 165 (explaining
that “even though DTC advertisements may be technically truthful, these advertisements mislead consumers because consumers lack the specialized
knowledge needed to evaluate the information effectively”); Lenhardt, Why So
Glum?, supra note 92, at 167–68.
179. See Davis, supra note 40, at 863–64.
180. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 8 (2004), cited in Vladeck, supra
note 174.
181. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 26. Cf. DTC Prescription Drug
Advertising, supra note 114.
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immediate attention. Regardless of the marketing strategy,
DTCA consistently emphasizes the drug’s benefits to outweigh the side effects.
Accordingly, some argue that DTCA creates a “disease
mongering” problem whereby patients decide they have the
problem mentioned in an ad (e.g. restless leg syndrome) and
request the miracle cure from their doctor.182 This increases
prescription drug use, and consequently, the cost of health
care, but does not lead to a healthier population.183 When
doctors inappropriately prescribe medication, drug companies
are shielded from blame by claiming the prescribing physician as a “ learned intermediary ” with the “ ultimate
responsibility for prescribing drugs.”184
While “many physicians believe that educated patients
are easier to treat and care for,” few “believe that DTC
advertisements are educationally effective.”185 Rather than
promoting productive communications between doctors and
patients, DTCA “create[s] unreasonable or inappropriate patient expectations for product effectiveness and often lead
patients to request inappropriate products for their medical
needs.”186 “Physicians may relent to patient pressure, even if
it is not in the [patient’s] best interest.”187 One survey found
182. Susan Heylman, Widely Advertised ‘Restless Legs’ Drugs Move into
Court, 44 TRIAL 14, 14, 16 (2008) (explaining disease mongering and that while
Consumer Reports, for example, has identified restless leg syndrome as an example of disease mongering, it is a real disease according to the National
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke); see also Moynihan et al., Selling
Sickness, supra note 4, at 886.
183. Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering:
Generating Knowledge for Action, Public Library of Science, 3 PUB. LIBR. SCI.
MED. e191, e191 (2006), available at http://collections.plos.org/plosmedicine/pdf/
plme-03-04-diseasemongering.pdf.
184. Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient Encounters Involving Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-226 (Apr. 28, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.219.short);
Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 515; Terzian, supra note 3, at 161 (“The
learned intermediary doctrine holds that an adequate warning by a prescribing
physician discharges a manufacturer’s duty to warn.”) However, as seen in Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, the doctrine does not shield manufacturers
from potential liability when the FDA mandates a direct warning to patients.
Terzian, supra note 3, at 162.
185. Terzian, supra note 3, at 158.
186. Id.; see also Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n,
Direct-to-Consumer Advertisements of Prescription Drugs, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
119, 122–23 (2000) (noting that the American Medical Association believes that
DTCA causes a time burden on physicians).
187. Terzian, supra note 3, at 157; see also Angell, Relationships, supra note
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that physicians prescribe the advertised and requested drug
39% of the time despite not “believ[ing it is] the best medical—or economic—option.”188 In many cases, the providers
felt another drug would have been equally effective, and in
some cases, the physicians even stated that they believed that
a different course of action would have been more
beneficial.189 For instance, doctors frequently prescribed the
heavily-advertised Claritin despite it working only 11% better
than a placebo and the existence of other more effective medications.190 In the event that the doctor refuses to prescribe
the drug, the patient may just doctor-shop until he finds one
who will comply with his demand. Refusal to prescribe may
also generate tension between the doctor and the patient, who
does not understand the rationale, thereby placing a strain on
the doctor-patient relationship in which trust and honesty are
critical.191 Thus, industry “may be creating demand where
there is no need and thereby harming the doctor-patient relationship.”192
The FDA’s use of the same regulatory standard for DTCA
and physician advertising also presents a problem.193 Doctors, by virtue of their basic professional requirements, may
consider drug advertising in context and better comprehend
risk information and research further.194 As a third party, the
8 (explaining that doctors may go along with prescribing the requested medicine
since it is easier than suggesting an alternate course of treatment).
188. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 24.
189. Id. (citing Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient Encounters Involving Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-226 (Apr. 28,
2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.219.
short); see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 8 (explaining that “adverts are
mostly for me-too drugs and are designed to convince viewers that one is better
than another, despite the fact that these drugs are seldom compared in clinical
trials at equivalent doses”).
190. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25.
191. Terzian, supra note 3, at 157.
192. Id. at 165.
193. But see Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 350 (arguing that “
[b]ecause DTC marketing of prescription drugs has not fundamentally altered
the playing field, traditional rules of law should remain fully viable”).
194. But see Lenhardt, Why So Glum?, supra note 92, at 166 (arguing that
doctors are sometimes unknowingly deceived by DTCA). Additionally, physicians are human and some are persuaded by the perks offered by the drug
companies, and some are unavoidably influenced by the inundation of the
pharmaceutical representatives who flood their offices, a practice known as detailing. Accordingly, there is currently a rising concern with detailing and an
increased focus on attempting to institute academic detailing which involves
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physician will not experience the same emotional response as
the patient. Despite the continuing medical education requirements, keeping up with the latest advances in the everevolving medical field presents a challenge for doctors. Thus,
drug detailing alerting doctors to a new treatment option may
serve as a useful additional means of keeping doctors current.195 DTCA, on the other hand, targets patients who lack
the specialized knowledge to comprehend and appropriately
weigh a drug’s risks and benefits.196
Yet, currently the government appears more focused on
the undue influence of the industry on doctors rather than
consumers. Recently, Congress enacted the Physician Payment Sunshine Act, which requires, among other things, drug
companies to disclose gifts and payments to doctors, as Congress believes they generate conflicts of interest and biases.197
While industry influence over the medical profession presents
legitimate concerns, it should not be the sole legislative focus.
DTCA also results in increased healthcare spending since
only the brand drugs advertise and the adverting reduces
consumer price sensitivity. 198 Even when a consumer requests and receives a medically necessary drug as a result of
DTCA, the ad often leads to wasteful spending by convincing
patients they need the brand name drug, when a cheaper generic would be equally effective.199 This effect is magnified by
the fact that most consumers have health insurance and thus
unbiased sources providing doctors with summaries of the best treatments with
a focus on quality and a consideration of costs. For a more detailed discussion,
please see Mark Navin, Program to Inform Doctors about Drugs at Risk, RADIO
BOSTON (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.radioboston.org/2010/01/08/program-toinform-doctors-about-drugs-at-risk/.
195. Advertising to physicians is still problematic and academic detailing
should be implemented to replace pharmaceutical advertising to physicians.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (explaining detailing as a process through which pharmaceutical salespersons, generally
armed with background information on the physician’s prescribing patterns, to
persuade the physician to prescribe a particular drug). “Detailers bring drug
samples as well as medical studies that explain the ‘details’ and potential advantages of various prescription drugs. Interested physicians listen, ask
questions, and receive follow-up [sic] data.” Id.
196. Terzian, supra note 3, at 165.
197. S. 301, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3138, 111th Cong. (2009).
198. See generally John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L. & ECON.
89, 89–91 (1999) (primary effect of advertising drugs is to reduce consumer price
sensitivity).
199. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
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do not absorb the full cost of the drug. Accordingly, the irrational preference for brand over generic drug is another way
in which DTCA increases unnecessary healthcare spending.
Allowing an advertising tax deduction also incentivizes
the industry to invest additional resources in advertising to
increase the life and profitability of their existing drugs
rather than invest in research and development for new
drugs.200 The patent system already provides drug companies
with incentives to create drugs by allowing exclusivity periods
for the first drug manufacturer to get a New Drug Application
and the first generic drug to get an Abbreviated New Drug
Application. Accordingly, these exclusivity periods, put in
place to encourage research and development, allow the industry to profit from the drugs they make. Yet incentives are
misaligned when more money is spent on administrative costs
than research and development. Thus, removing the tax deduction may help shift the incentives from encouraging
companies to invest in prolonging the profitability of existing
drugs to investing the money into new drugs.201
2. Lobbying
Unlike DTCA, Congress specifically exempts most lobbying from the deductible category of “ordinary and necessary
business expenses.” 202 Like advertising, the First Amendment and several Supreme Court decisions limit Congress’
ability to regulate lobbying. 203 Nevertheless, Congress removed the tax deductions for lobbying as a means of
regulating and limiting the activity to “reduc[e the] possible
nefarious effects.”204 The line of reasoning applied by Congress to the allowance and removal of the deductions for
200. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et. al., Extensions of Intellectual Property
Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on Medicaid Spending,
25 HEALTH AFF. 1637, 1638 (2006) (explaining the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ practice of using various tactics to extend the life of their existing “
blockbuster” drugs known as “evergreening”).
201. Terzian, supra note 3, at 165 (stating that critics of DTCA “argue that
the money spent on expensive television advertising could be better spent on
research and development of products, or to reduce the price of pharmaceutical
products, thereby promotion public health and welfare”).
202. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 495. For a discussion of the definition of lobbying in the tax context and exactly what is and is not included, see
generally id. at 508–18.
203. See id. at 492.
204. Id. at 492–96, 507–08, 517–18.
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lobbying expenses, and grassroots lobbying specifically, also
applies to DTCA.205
Originally, Congress recognized lobbying expenses as included within the IRC’s definition of ordinary and necessary
business expenses and permitted their deduction.206 Like advertising, Congress observed that permitting the deduction
for lobbying “would improve the flow of information.”207 In
spite of that belief, Congress did not find value in extending
deductibility to grassroots lobbying that targets the public to
assist with lobbying activities.208 That distinction implicitly
recognized the susceptibility of the general public to persuasion on topics about which they likely have little base
knowledge. If Congress, however, attempted to distinguish
between deductible and non-deductible lobbying based on the
identity of the speaker or the content of the lobbying, that
would violate the First Amendment under Sorrell.209
Additionally, Congress did not extend the revocation of
the deductibility of lobbying expenses to charities, distinguishing between those who stand to profit from their efforts
and those who do not.210 This reflects Congress’ concern
for both influence over the public and the actors’ motivation
in attempting to influence. Despite the importance of prescription drugs, the pharmaceutical industry is not in the
same class as charities. Thus, the DTCA tax deductions could
similarly be revoked.211

205. Cf. id. at 492–96.
206. See id. at 498 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 17 (1962)).
207. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at
17; S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 24 (1962)). They also noted that this “would reduce
the administrative burden.” Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498. But see
infra Part II.D (discussing how removing tax deductions does not necessarily
substantially increase administrative burdens).
208. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498–99.
209. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011).
210. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 517 (“Congress felt that charities
were more likely to exercise their influence in a positive way, particularly with
respect to providing information to government actors and to the public.”); see
also I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2006).
211. For example, the potential for disease mongering and the potential
negative impact on the doctor-patient relationship. See Moynihan & Henry, supra note 183, at e191; Terzian, supra note 3, at 158.
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Increased FDA Regulations as an Alternative Solution

The FDA, the agency in charge of regulating DTCA under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, should be the appropriate agency to implement changes to the current system
and solve the DTCA problem. If indeed DTCA is misleading
or not truthful, then the FDA has ample constitutional room
to regulate it. FDA, however, has failed to rise to the challenge of sufficiently regulating DTCA and has left legislators
concerned with current DTCA practices and searching for a
solution.212 This failure stems from two major roadblocks: 1)
the FDA lacks the necessary funding and resources; and 2)
the FDA would have difficulty specifically identifying nontruthful or misleading speech, and therefore would face practical difficulties in constitutionally increasing DTCA content
regulation. FDA requires an average of forty-five days to review ads once they air.213 A 2006 Government Accounting
Office (GAO) report indicated that sometimes by the time
FDA issues a warning on a misleading ad, its publication has
already concluded.214 Even when the FDA condemns an ad
and the company ceases publication of the misleading ad,
during the lag time inevitably some viewers saw the original
advertisement and will either not see or disregard, the corrected version.215 Further, in a 2009 Congressional Research
Service report, the problem was recognized specifically in an
area in which the FDA already has authority, but has failed
to utilize.216 The FDA lacks the manpower to review every
advertisement prior to public viewing or to create a user fee
program.217 FDA staffing has not kept pace with the increase
in number of drugs or advertisements.218 As a result, in 2004,
212. See, e.g., ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 124 (“Obviously, given
the nature of the ads we’re subjected to, the [FDA] fails at [its] job.”).
213. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
214. Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 348.
215. Tim Kelly & John Busbice, Measuring the Effectiveness of DTC Advertising, 18 PRODUCT MGMT. TODAY 20, 21 (2007) (“TV advertising drives a sharp
increase in new therapy starts for the first week or two after exposure and a
more gradual increase in cumulative total prescriptions through week 36.”).
216. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–29.
217. Cf. 21 U.S.C.A. § 353b (West 2010) (“The Secretary may require the
submission of any television advertisement for a drug.”) (emphasis added).
218. See Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 679 (“[T]he number
of staff members who are dedicated to reviewing advertisements has remained
relatively stable, whereas the use of such advertising has grown substantially.
In 2002, three FDA staff members were dedicated to reviewing direct-to-
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the FDA only reviewed approximately 32% of advertisements
submitted before airing.219
Following the passing of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), on March 14, 2007,
then FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach issued a
statement including a discussion of “a new program to assess
fees for advisory reviews of DTC television advertisements.”220
In addressing the concerns regarding the imbalance of risk
and benefit information provided in DTCA, companies’ ability
to submit ads for review, and the industry’s awareness of the
benefits of the optional review, von Eschenbach also noted the
FDA’s increasing workload and the lack of a corresponding
increase in staff.221 As a solution, von Eschenbach proposed
instituting a program where companies volunteering to have
their ads reviewed by FDA would pay a user fee which would
be used to “increase[] FDA resources to allow for . . . timely
review . . . and ensure FDA input[.]”222 FDA anticipated that
these fees would generate several million in revenue and enable them to hire twenty-seven new employees to review
ads.223 Under this arrangement, companies could get FDA
approval prior to broadcasting their ads and thus not risk enforcement action against them.
On January 3, 2008, however, the Federal Register
printed a notice that the “User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertisements for
Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will Not
Be Implemented[.]”224 As a result, the FDA concluded that in
lieu of a user fee, “[a]dvertisements voluntarily submitted for
FDA review will be reviewed in as timely a manner as re-

consumer advertisements. In 2004, four staffers were reviewing such advertisements, even though spending on this form of advertising (and probably the
volume of ads to review) had increased by 45%, from $2.9 billion to $4.2 billion.”
).
219. Id.
220. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 110th
Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Eschenbach statement] (statement of Andrew C. von
Eschenbach, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin.).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 8.
223. Id.
224. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008).
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sources permit.”225 Since the FDA by its own admission is incapable of reviewing the ads in a timely manner, few
companies are likely to voluntarily submit ads.226
This failure of the law may not be quite as large a deficiency as it appears.
First, the proposal was merely
voluntary and thus would not solve the compliance problem. 227 Second, the program would require significant
resources to merely obtain a non-legally-binding FDA recommendation. Third, not even the FDA believed that the
program would have received the $11 million necessary to
make the undertaking worthwhile.228 Finally, the FDA would
also face First Amendment limits, as noted above, on its ability to regulate the content of the ads.
In an August 6, 2009 speech, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg acknowledged a “steep decline in the FDA’s
enforcement activity over the past several years.”229 Not surprisingly, the violations which “have gone unaddressed for far
too long” include misleading advertising. 230 As Hamburg
noted, “[t]hese delays do not result from a lack of commitment
by FDA career staff.”231 FDA has recently demonstrated its
promised commitment to enforcement of existing regulations
by issuing more warning letters.232 These efforts and good intentions, however, are insufficient. In light of its increased
authority in recent years, the overburdened-FDA simply does
not possess the means or funds to increase its enforcement
power in order to make a substantial impact on the current
situation.233
225. Id.
226. Eschenbach statement, supra note 220, at 7 (“As a result, it is impossible for FDA to review all of the DTC television advertisement advisory
submissions it receives in a timely manner.”).
227. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. at 2924.
228. See id.
229. Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drugs Admin., Remarks on
“Effective Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health” at Food and Drug Law
Institute (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Hamburg, Remarks], available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm175983.htm.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Pettypiece, supra note 54 (“As a result, the agency issued 41 warning
letters to drug makers, or almost double the number in 2008.”).
233. FDA expanded authority by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007.
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According to a January 2010 article, Thomas Abrams, Director of the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and
Communications, reported that “[o]ver the last five years, the
[FDA] has increased the number of people monitoring ads by
50% to 60% in an effort to keep” pace with advertising.234
Some may argue that the 4.7% decrease of DTCA in the first
three quarters of 2009, compared to the previous year, indicates the FDA’s increased enforcement is already helping
reduce the frequency of DTCA. The trend, however, can more
likely be attributed to the current financial crisis and companies’ reluctance to spend money.235
Thus, there are problems with various aspects of the current DTCA regulation, which either cannot or will not be
remedied by FDA action. Practical constraints prevent the
FDA from serving as a realistic, practical, or sufficient solution to the DTCA problem. Any change to the FDA’s
responsibility would not only increase their responsibility, but
also decrease available funds and resources for other programs. Moreover, constitutional concerns frustrate attempts
to strengthen FDA regulation of DTCA content.
D. Disincentivizing DTCA Through the IRC Would Not
Cause an Administrative Burden
Instituting an ex-ante user fee imposed through the FDA
would accomplish the same goals, but would increase the
FDA’s work and responsibilities. Conversely, removing the
tax deductions would not entail increasing the IRS’ budget,
resources, or responsibility, but would still raise revenue.236
As some scholars have pointed out, a benefit of instituting a
disincentive through tax penalties in the IRC is low administrative cost.237 The taxable status of advertising is already at
issue in the IRC and this approach is clearly feasible since its
234. Pettypiece, supra note 54Error! Bookmark not defined..
235. Id. (noting the decrease in advertising spending and that “the recession
has been partly to blame”).
236. See Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (“Each year pharmaceutical companies spend nearly $18 billion for advertising, marketing, and promotion of
prescription drugs, and the tax deduction these companies receive amounts to
$6.3 billion a year according to the Congressional Research Service.”).
237. See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, Tax and Spending, supra note 20, at 958;
Walker, supra note 6, at 1259–60 (explaining that under Eric Zolt’s analysis of
tax penalties, the low administrative costs “offset the crudeness of the incentives provided”).
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treatment varies among of different types of advertising.238
Also, for the targeted companies, the complexity will be small,
especially considering the billions to be received. As a result
of the low administrative cost, the IRC “includes numerous
provisions that discourage particular non-tax behaviors.”239
For instance, IRC Section 162(m) imposes a tax penalty on
certain executive salaries instead of having another agency
directly regulate.
For this reason, the removal of the deductions for DTCA
has been widely supported as demonstrated by the proposed
legislation and arguments from scholars. For instance, the
2009 CRS Report suggested removing the tax deduction for
advertising as a means of “[m]ak[ing] DTC Advertising [l]ess
[p]rofitable to [i]ndustry” which would thereby reduce the
overall level of DTC.240 As one scholar argues, the Tax Code
serves as a logical first place for Congress to attempt to regulate lobbying since it “requires spending money, and when
money is spent, there is always the question of how to treat
those expenditures for tax purposes. ” 241 Alternatively, “
[p]utting a program into the tax system makes the tax system
look more complicated, but there is unseen simplification
elsewhere.”242 Moreover, the imposition of a monetary disincentive does not require any specialized knowledge.243 Thus,
as a result of the faulty information portrayed in DTCA, the
First Amendment hindering practical regulation of DTCA,
and the FDA’s limited resources, taxation remains one policy
mechanism constitutionally available to Congress to remedy
the negative effects of DTCA.

238. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006) (allowing a deduction for advertising in some instances, such as DTCA, but not allowing certain other instances, including
certain foreign advertising).
239. Walker, supra note 6 (including several examples of tax disincentives
and stating that the effect of these “provisions is to raise the effective cost of—
and to discourage—the disfavored activity”); see also I.R.C. § 162.
240. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 32–33.
241. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 494.
242. Weisbach & Nussim, Tax and Spending, supra note 20, at 958.
243. See id. at 958–59. Authors explained that where specialization is not
required for a particular task, there may be benefits to coordinating certain activities. Id. Accordingly, this would be an appropriate instance to use the Tax
Code, which is already being used rather than to start trying to find another
way to achieve the same result. Id.
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Potential Problems

As with every piece of legislation, removing the tax deductions for DTCA presents several concerns. It is possible
that even if DTCA becomes more expensive, the industry will
not shift its spending to research and development. Rather,
the drug companies could respond by shifting the spending to
other promotional activities such as drug detailing, health
outreach fairs, or grants to patient advocacy groups. The
wealth of alternatives might strengthen the argument that
the change in the Tax Code did not impermissibly constrain
speech, since the companies retain many other ways to disseminate their messages. Indeed, the DTCA channel itself
remains fully legal, with only the public subsidy removed.
Of course, if the industry reacted by increasing total drug
advertising, some of the congressional policy objectives would
not be met. While predicting the industry’s next move if Congress eliminates the tax deduction presents a challenge,244
whether the policy achieves its goals will be an empirical
question.
Additionally, the removal of the deductions for DTCA
may either disproportionately impact different companies for
the same conduct 245 and may result in over deterrence of
DTCA. Denying deductions is not intended to cease DTCA,
but rather to remove the public subsidy. Proponents’ arguments include some justifications for the practice that, if true,
provide compelling reasons to ensure its continued existence.
Accordingly, while the removal of deductions would probably
not lead to complete deterrence 246 this Article argues that
some measure of deterrence through the IRC is the appropriate means to deter. Thus, in the alternative to the removal of
244. See Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 677–78 (“Driven by
increases in direct-to-consumer advertising, total promotion as a percentage of
sales has increased substantially during the past 5 years, leading some observers to worry that consumers must bear these increased costs in the form of
higher prices. Economic theory and evidence suggest that changes in marketing
costs are unlikely to have a direct effect on pharmaceutical prices, which largely
reflect perceptions of product value held by consumers, physicians, and payers.
Of course, it is possible that advertising reduces the price responsiveness of demand and thus leads manufacturers to increase prices, but the empirical
evidence on this point is mixed.”).
245. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1259–60 (explaining Eric Zolt’s article discussing the effect of tax penalties).
246. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 6, at 1275–79 (for an explanation of optimal
and complete deterrence).
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the deductions, Congress should institute a cap on the
amount which may be deducted for DTCA, just as they have
done for certain executive compensation, to reduce spending.247
CONCLUSION
In the face of compelling public policy justifications, as
judged by Congress, the Tax Code could be revised to deny
tax deductions for DTCA. The removal of this public subsidy
would be constitutional and the likely resulting decrease is
public exposure to DTCA is properly aligned with public policy. The First Amendment protects commercial-free speech
and does not allow Congress to discriminate on the basis of
content and speaker to restrict certain parties’ use and access
to information, but allows others. Under the First Amendment, Congress also may not institute a law preventing
companies from spending money on protected speech. These
protections, however, do not require Congress to continue to
subsidize DTCA with a subsidy from the public fisc.

247. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (stating that “[i]n the case of any publicly
held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable
employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that
the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000”).

